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Introduction 
An important issue in the theory of organizational learning is the relation between learning by 
people and learning on the level of the organization (Cook and Yanow 1996, Weick and 
Westley 1996). Between the level of the organization and the level of individuals, there is an 
intermediate level of teams or groups. The question addressed in this paper is whether there 
are other types of groups than the ‘communities of practice’ proposed by Brown and Duguid 
(1996). 
 In knowledge, there is an old distinction, going back to the ancient Greeks, between 
‘episteme’ (explanatory knowledge, understanding) and ‘techne’ (know-how, ability to 
perform). Studies of memory yield a distinction between ‘declarative’ memory (knowledge of 
facts, explanations) and ‘procedural’ memory (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996). Procedural 
knowledge is, like techne, ability to perform. It is non-canonical, and embedded in practice, 
or practice-bound (Wenger 1998). A third distinction, going back to the work of Michael 
Polanyi, is that between tacit knowledge, which is locked in the mind, and codified 
knowledge, which can be documented. The connection between these concepts is that 
techne/procedural knowledge, being practice-bound, is highly but not necessarily entirely 
tacit.  
 There is no problem in recognizing that on the organizational level there is an ability 
(‘techne’) for collective performance (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996), in standard operating 
procedures, performance programs (March and Simon 1958), routines (Nelson and Winter 
1982), or organizational scripts (Gioia and Poole 1984, Nooteboom 2000). There, people 
mutually adapt and combine skills and knowledge, and knowledge is distributed. Generally, 
no single person is able to grasp the procedure in its entirety. So, here we have knowledge 
that obtains on the organizational and not on the individual level. 
 Does an organization also have knowledge in the sense of ‘episteme’? Clearly, it can 
have documented knowledge, in blueprints, formulae, standard operating procedures, and the 
like. It can have knowledge embodied in a machine, prototype or organizational structure. 
However, it does not literally have a mind, and can at best dispose of a collection of minds of 
people. That collection of minds may have structural or procedural similarities to individual 
minds, but at most the mind serves as a metaphor or a model. 
 On the organizational level there cannot be tacit knowledge other than that embodied 
in its people. However, people are able, with complications that will be discussed later, to 
exchange and share tacit knowledge. Of course, when individual knowledge is codified and 
documented, it can become part of organizational memory in the form of documents that are 
stored electronically or in hardcopy. However, it can never do so completely. No formally 
documented procedure can be complete in practice, including all the relevant procedural 
knowledge. In fact, one way to obstruct work processes, is to ‘work to rule’. Practice is 
always context dependent, and requires context-specific knowledge to ‘fill the holes’ in 
formal procedures, or ‘work around’ specifications that do not fit specific, local conditions 
(Brown and Duguid, 1996). As a result, supplementary uncodified, context-specific 
knowledge held by people is generally needed.  
 It may be, however, that people can share such partly non-codified, procedural or 
non-canonical knowledge, in a team or community of practice (Brown and Duguid 1996). 
The latter has been defined as a ‘group of people informally bound together by shared 
expertise and passion for a joint enterprise’ (Wenger and Snyder 2000: 139). This suggests 
that between the level of the organization and the level of individuals, there is an 
intermediate level of teams or groups. They go beyond the individual level because they 
share the organizational property of a collective practice with distributed knowledge. 
However, on the level of a team more tacit, procedural knowledge may be shared than would 
be possible on the level of the organization. 
 The question we address in this paper is whether in the context of organizational 
learning there are other types of groups than the communities of practice proposed by Brown 
and Duguid. In what ways do people in organizations get together to learn what knowledge? 
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 In our approach we combine competence and governance perspectives (cf. 
Williamson 1999). The governance perspective, as proposed in transaction cost economics, 
neglects learning, innovation and the development of competencies. The competence 
perspective tends to neglect issues of dependence, power, and relational risks of hold-up and 
spillover. We want to include both competence formation and governance of relational risk. 
 We proceed as follows. First, we specify the theory of knowledge and learning that 
we use, and the implications of ‘cognitive distance’ for learning by interaction. Next, we 
analyze aspects of governance. On the basis of those theoretical analyses we explore the 
relevant dimensions of social structures for learning. Subsequently, we turn to the empirical 
analysis, which consists of an exploration of social structures for learning in a consultancy 
firm, to see to what extent our theoretical analysis helps to explain how and why they work or 
fail to work.  
 
Theory of knowledge 
It is a truism to say that information is not the same as knowledge: to become knowledge, 
information needs to be interpreted in a cognitive framework. We employ a theory of 
knowledge and language derived from ‘symbolic interactionism’ in sociology (G.H. Mead), 
and the view, taken from cognitive psychology, that intelligence is internalized action (Piaget 
1970, 1974, Vygotsky 1962, Bruner 1962). In contrast with the dominant ‘computational 
representational’ view in cognitive science, this leads to the view of knowledge in terms of 
‘situated action’. Knowledge and the meaning of words are not independent from context. 
They lie partly in the context of use, and they shift from one context to another. This 
connects with the notion of procedural knowledge indicated before. For a more detailed 
analysis, see Nooteboom (2000). 
 The theory states that cognition takes place on the basis of mental categories (or 
models or schemata) that are partly developed in interaction with one’s physical and social 
environment. Those categories constitute our absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990), i.e. our ability to perceive, interpret and evaluate phenomena. Interpretation, in the 
transformation of information into knowledge, entails integration with existing knowledge. 
This may yield novel combinations (associations), yielding new insight into logical or causal 
relations. Those provide the basis for evaluation of utility or value, on the basis of means-end 
relations. 
 This process precludes objective knowledge (or at least any certain knowledge 
whether or to what extent knowledge is objective). We form perceptions, interpretations and 
evaluations according to cognitive or mental categories. This is called the ‘constructivist’, 
‘interpretative’ or ‘hermeneutic view’ (cf. Weick 1979, 1995). However, to the extent that 
interaction between people is sustained and intensive, it will yield shared or similar mental 
categories. 
 Mental categories or schemata are more or less tacit. This applies, for example, to 
pattern recognition, as proposed long ago by Hayek. That arises in many areas, such as 
shapes of objects or drawings, physiognomy, practices, conditions and motives of behaviour. 
In discussions of tacit knowledge there is a tendency to see tacit and codified knowledge as 
substitutes, as when tacit knowledge is ‘externalized’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) into 
codified knowledge. However, there is also complementarity: underlying, tacit categories are 
needed to interpret and evaluate information (externalized knowledge) transmitted in 
communication. People properly understand and trust each other only if they sufficiently 
share underlying categories. When those are both tacit and incongruent, there is a problem. 
They may then first have to develop shared categories, by more or less ongoing and intense 
interaction, to establish shared tacit knowledge by ‘indwelling in the experiences, 
perspective, and concepts of other participants’ (Van Krogh 1998: 114), or what Lissoni 
(2001) called an ‘epistemic community’. The term ‘indwelling’ derives from Michael 
Polanyi. Outsiders will understand less what is going on in such a community. To become an 
effective member, one is first located at the periphery, to become socialized into the 
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categories shared in the community, before one can enter into ‘full participation’. This 
process has been called ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991). 
 Note that the view of cognition set out above is highly social, in two ways. First, 
knowledge is social because it is contingent upon interaction between people (see also Berger 
and Luckmann 1967, Elkjaer 1999). Second, it is social because rational and emotional 
aspects are intertwined. People develop categories of perception and of logical and causal 
inference, as well as judgement of value. This includes the attribution of competencies, 
values, goals and motives to other people, which are emotion-laden. In other words, cognition 
is closely related with social-psychological aspects of behaviour (Gherardi 1999, Edmondson 
1999, Cook and Brown 1999, Lave and Wenger 1991). 
 
Cognitive distance and its implications for learning 
From our view of knowledge it follows that to the extent that people have developed their 
knowledge in different environments, and have not been in communication with each other, 
cognition will differ: there will be greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’ (Nooteboom 1992, 
1999a). Cognitive distance yields both an opportunity and a problem. The opportunity is that 
contact with others gives us a possibility to escape from the myopia of our personal cognitive 
construction, by profiting from the different insights of others, based on different experience. 
A problem, however, is that the greater the cognitive distance, the more difficult it is to cross 
it, i.e. to understand the actions and expressions of a partner. Thus there is something like an 
optimal cognitive distance: large enough for partners to tell each other something new, and 
small enough for comprehension. Absorptive capacity is part of our ability to cross cognitive 
distance. The other part is communicative capacity, or the ability to help others understand 
what we do or say, especially the tacit dimension. 
 In order to reduce cognitive distance, or to develop absorptive and communicative 
capacity to cross cognitive distance, one may need to engage in investments that are specific 
in the sense of transaction cost economics. That entails that in a different team one would 
have to make such investments again. This results from the condition that categories of 
thought and perceived meanings are to a greater or lesser extent context- and pathdependent, 
as was shown above. As a result, according to the logic of transaction cost economics, the 
relations involved have to have sufficient duration to recoup the investment. Summing up: 
one will invest in becoming member of an epistemic community only if one expects that 
membership will last sufficiently long to make the effort worth while.   
 Next to cognitive considerations in the narrow sense, there are also considerations 
from (social) psychology. We infer causes of behaviour and we attribute characteristics and 
motives to people according to mental categories or schemata. We can identify with people, 
and have empathy with them, to the extent that there is similarity of such behavioural 
schemata. These are generally based on shared experience in the process of indwelling 
indicated before. Empathy is highly relevant for trust, because it helps us to correctly 
attribute motives, sympathize with them and perhaps tolerate deviations from expectations. In 
other words, trust depends on the extent that people share cognitive categories (have limited 
cognitive distance).  
 Another aspect is cognitive dissonance: we may subconsciously resist information 
that is in conflict with established and cherished views or convictions, particularly if it would 
require the admission of mistaken choices in the past. Past acts have to be justified to oneself 
and to others, even at the cost of distorting facts or construing artificial arguments. Personal 
identities and social positions are at stake. 
 One definition of learning is the ability to respond differently to the same stimuli one 
had before. However, one might also learn to respond to new stimuli. There is learning in the 
sense of adopting existing knowledge from others, and there is learning in the sense of 
knowledge creation, i.e. developing or discovering new knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995). There is a distinction between learning to do existing things better, and to do new 
things. The first has variously been called first order, single loop learning or learning for 
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exploitation, and the second has been called second order, double loop or exploratory 
learning (Argyris and Schön 1978, Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976, Fiol & Lyles 1985, 
March 1991). To perform and survive in the short term one must do the first, and to survive 
in the long term one must do the second. So, one should do both, but that is not easy. To 
improve existing performance one often needs to maintain stability of existing structures in 
the division of labour, clear and unambiguous standards and terms. Consequently, efficient 
exploitation generally requires limited cognitive distance. For exploration one must relax 
existing tasks and structures and experiment with novel configurations, relaxing existing 
standards and meanings, and trying out new ones. Consequently, exploration requires greater 
cognitive distance and looser ties. One way to achieve cognitive distance is to implement a 
high turnover of group membership relative to the speed at which members are socialized to 
group ideas and practices (March 1991). 
 
Governance 
In learning, we must pay attention not only to competence, but also to governance, i.e. the 
control of relational risk. Exchange of knowledge has implications for social and strategic 
position. Giving knowledge or advice, and being seen to do so, can yield prestige, while 
receiving knowledge or advice can diminish it. Giving knowledge can be strategically risky 
because of potential ‘spillover’ problems. If the knowledge is close to ‘core competence’ or 
competitive advantage, then its adoption by potential competitors could threaten one’s 
strategic position. A partner may use sensitive information as a hostage, i.e. threaten to 
divulge it to the competition if he does not get his way. In the literature on inter-firm relations 
such problems have been recognized (see, for example, Nooteboom 1999a). However, they 
apply also between individuals within a firm, to the extent that they compete for job positions 
and careers within the firm, as is typically the case in professional organizations such as 
consultancy firms.   
 There is no spillover risk if the knowledge given is not close to one’s core 
competence, or when potential competitors lack the necessary absorptive capacity, or if by 
the time potential competitors have absorbed and implemented the knowledge it has already 
changed. If there is spillover risk, the value of knowledge one gains may exceed the disutility 
of spillover, so that one accepts it. If that is not the case, one way to control spillover is to 
have direct control over what happens to knowledge supplied to partners, to check that it does 
not spill over to competitors. If that cannot be done, another strategy is to demand 
exclusiveness: the partners one gives sensitive information to are not allowed to have ties 
with the competition in that area. However, one pays a price for such exclusiveness, in 
several ways. It reduces the variety of contacts that is the prime source of learning. By 
allowing partners to have contacts with one’s competitors, those partners would have more 
varied sources of learning, which makes them more attractive as partners. Exclusiveness 
entails that one has to carry the full burden of training and teaching the partner, rather than 
sharing that effort with others. Also, exclusiveness yields costs of monitoring, to control that 
exclusiveness is indeed maintained. Such monitoring may not be possible, in which case the 
demand for exclusiveness becomes an empty one.  
 Another aspect of strategic position is dependence as a result of investments. As 
indicated before, if one has to make specific investments in order to communicate (cross 
cognitive distance), then one becomes dependent. Here we have the so-called hold-up 
problem. Group membership would have to last sufficiently long to recoup that investment. 
Next to specific investments to build mutual understanding, one may have to invest in 
building personalized trust, which also constitutes a specific investment. 
 How does one control or limit relational risk of spillover and hold-up? Control may 
be based on rewards, incentives, punishments, in short ‘deterrence’ (Shapiro et. al. 1992, 
Maguire et. al. 2001). Many authors feel that such control is foreign to the notion of trust, 
and that ‘genuine’ trust is based on other, more social and personal foundations of 
trustworthiness, such as loyalty, empathy, friendship, reciprocity, a sense of moral duty or 
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obligation, and routinized behaviour. Trust is a complex concept, and cannot be fully dealt 
with here (see Nooteboom 2002). Here, we mention only the most salient aspects, in the 
context of the present paper. 
 In trust in people (‘behavioural trust’), it is useful to make a distinction between trust 
in competence, trust in intentions for fair dealing, trust in honesty or truthfulness, and trust in 
institutional conditions that affect actions and their outcomes. Here, these conditions refer to 
organizational conditions, such as structure and culture. Will a potential partner in the firm 
be able to perform and act as a source of learning (competence)? Will he not expropriate 
knowledge he receives, and use it to compete, and will he in fact be committed to utilize his 
competence for mutual benefit (intentions)? Will he tell the truth about his competence and 
intentions (honesty)? Will he be supported by organizational roles and procedures, and will 
he support the intentions and values of the organization? If expectations are disappointed, 
how can one identify the cause? If the partner is in fact opportunistic, it is precisely in that 
case that he will deny his intentions, and will claim an accident or a temporary lapse in 
competence to explain any violation of expectations. That is why honesty is so important. 
 Another feature of trust is that when people need each other more, or are locked into 
each other, there is a greater need for trust. 
 An important question of course is what the sources of trustworthiness are, especially 
for intentions. What makes someone act without opportunism, with commitment and care, 
and with honesty? Here, one can identify four different kinds of sources, summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
------------------------------ 
table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
 The source of cooperation may be universalistic (‘macro’), applying to everyone in a 
culture or community (in this case the organization) or particularistic (‘micro’), applying to a 
specific relation or set of relations in a team. It can be egoistic, oriented only to self-interest, 
or it can be altruistic, going beyond self-interest. When one governs relational risk on the 
basis of the partner’s self-interest, this yields the deterrence form of control indicated above. 
A self-interested macro source is legal coercion: the partner is forced to comply. Self-
interested micro sources yield incentives for the partner to comply: the partner depends on 
the value offered to him, one holds a hostage from him, or he needs to be seen to act decently 
in order to preserve a good reputation. Here, mutual dependence is based on strict ‘quid pro 
quo’. Altruistic macro sources are shared values and norms of behaviour. Altruistic micro 
sources are friendship, empathy, routinization or other bonding that may arise in a specific 
relationship. With strangers our starting point is ‘thin’ generalized trust based on general 
norms, and in a personalized relationship this may develop into ‘thick’ trust. Generally, 
identification-based trust, yielding empathy, is supposed to develop from ongoing 
collaboration, with ‘indwelling’, which leads to the development of shared cognitive 
categories (in the broad sense discussed before, including norms of behaviour) (see, for 
example Lewicki and Bunker 1996).  
 Table 1 yields the idea of a general notion of ‘reliance’, which includes all sources of 
cooperation, including those of coercion and self-interest (deterrence), and a stronger notion 
of trust, where as a result of motives that go beyond self-interest, people are expected, within 
limits,  not to be opportunistic even though they have an opportunity and an incentive for it. 
 Zand (1972) proposed a cycle in which trust engenders openness, yielding 
information, which provides a basis for the application and acceptance of mutual influence, 
which yields the willingness to demand less and accept more control from the partner, which 
further engenders trust. In other words, the provision of information based on trust promotes 
responsiveness to trust (Pettit 1995), which may already be latent but requires a trigger of 
information that has the dual function of demonstrating trust and reducing the risk of trust 
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reciprocation. This can set a positive dynamic of trust going. Thus, Zand (1972: 238) 
included openness in the conceptualization of trust as: ‘..  behaviour that conveys appropriate 
information, permits mutuality of influence, encourages self-control, and avoids abuse of the 
vulnerability of others’.  Here, we see a positive relation between trust and information: A 
trusts B and therefore gives information (even if B could use that to the detriment of A), 
which makes B trust A and give information in return. This confirms the close relationship 
between trust and the giving of information, and hence between trust and learning.  
 When we turn to the design of relations, some mix of sources of reliability will be in 
operation. No universally best mix, regardless of specific conditions, can be specified. Often, 
trust based on friend- or kinship will not suffice as a basis for cooperation. It may not be 
sufficiently robust under extremes of temptation. Unconditional trust is unwise: it is too 
much to expect that partners will be able to resist even the strongest temptations or pressures 
towards opportunism. Thus, it is generally wise to see trust as subject to tolerance levels: one 
will trust until events are perceived that exceed a partner’s ability to resist temptation or 
pressures of survival. Conversely, governance by deterrence can be very costly, and can 
break down the basis for the development of personalized trust. Apart from that, they are 
seldom sufficient as a basis for cooperation: one needs trust on the basis of non-egoistic 
sources to the extent that one cannot fully control the partner’s conduct by threat, and to 
make such fragile basis for cooperation more resilient. A particularly productive form of 
governance is that of mutual dependence, with reciprocity of value, in combination with trust 
(in the strong sense indicated above). 
  Resilience arises from what Hirschman (1970) called voice. In exit, one walks out 
when dissatisfied, avoiding argument. That is, one quits from one’s job, fires people, sells 
shares or part of a firm. In voice, the first response is not to walk out, but to seek amends. 
One reports one’s dissatisfaction, asks for an explanation, welcomes criticism and asks for 
and offers help to ‘work things out’ together by solving problems, repairing shortcomings and 
eliminating misunderstandings. Voice is associated with trust in the strong sense, and 
empathy is crucial for it. Empathy is based on identification that results from mutual 
indwelling. It entails sympathetic perceptiveness and imagination: the ability to see and 
respect the other’s goals, to imagine and regret the effects of one’s own faults for the other, 
and to make an effort to prevent them. Empathy also enables one to see when the limits of the 
other’s trustworthiness are or will be exceeded, due to pressures and temptations he is 
subjected to, and to have a reasonable guess where the limits lie, and on what conditions they 
depend. Therefore, empathy provides the basis for both trustworthiness and trust, as well as 
the basis for identifying the limits of both. The same perceptiveness that leads one to assess 
the damage one may cause to others leads one to assess conditions where the other may cause 
damage.  
 
Social structure 
In an analysis of groups, one should take social structure and dynamics into account. 
Network analysis in sociology recognizes a number of structural features that may be relevant 
also for groups within organizations. One is density, i.e. the number of ties connecting 
members. A second is centrality, i.e. the presence of one or more members that have ties to 
many other members which themselves have few ties. A third is structural equivalence, that 
is two or more members that have ties to more or less the same other members. Structurally 
equivalent members, having the same pattern of ties in the group, may be rivals in the group. 
A fourth is outside embeddedness, i.e. the extent that members are also members of other 
groups or networks. A fifth is structural holes, that is lack of ties between parts of the 
network. 
 The network literature suggests that members who span structural holes can gain 
advantage (Burt 1992). If individuals or communities A and B are connected only by C, then 
C can take advantage of his bridging position by accessing resources that others cannot 
access, and by playing off A and B against each other. In the context of information 
 8
exchange, he can, for example, threaten to pass sensitive information that he has from A to B 
and vice versa, and can thereby extract advantage from both. As a result, the third party is 
maximally powerful and minimally constrained in his actions. The Latin term for this third 
party advantage is ‘tertius gaudens’. Krackhardt (1999) pointed out that this principle goes 
back to Simmel (1950). However, Krackhardt shows that Simmel also indicated that under 
some conditions the third party is maximally constrained. This occurs when he bridges two 
different cliques, with dense and strong internal ties, with different values and norms, while 
his actions are observed by both. The third party then has to satisfy the rules or norms of both 
cliques (the intersection of norm sets). The key factor that determines whether the third party 
is minimally or maximally constrained is the degree to which the third party’s actions are 
public, or at least known to both A and B. If not, then the situation described by Burt obtains, 
and he is minimally constrained. If his actions are public, he is maximally constrained. 
 
Characteristics of learning groups 
From the review of concepts and theory, we can now derive a number of features that might 
be taken into account in the analysis of social structures for learning. They can be divided 
into four dimensions: type of learning, structural features, relational risk, and governance. 
 We distinguish four types of learning. Learning can be oriented at the level of the 
individual or at the level of a team or organization. The object of learning can be generic, 
context-independent knowledge or competence, or the improvement of a specific project or 
practice. It can be aimed at different degrees of learning: exploitation or exploration.  
 Structural features of groups include the familiar features of the patterns of ties: 
density, centrality, structural equivalence, outside ties and structural holes. To these five 
structural features we add the following. Sixth is cognitive distance that has to be crossed for 
mutual understanding, requiring specific investments. Seventh is the duration of ties in the 
group: are they durable or ad hoc? Eighth is the exclusiveness of the group, i.e. closure to 
outsiders. 
 Relational risk refers to social and strategic position. It includes, first of all, the need 
that partners have for each other, with limited or no alternatives. Are they ‘condemned to 
each other’? It also entails social and strategic risk. The first entails gain or loss of prestige, 
appreciation and legitimation. The latter entails gain or loss of position in the internal 
competition for jobs, dependence and power. This includes risks as a result of specific 
investments and spillover.  
 Governance is characterized broadly of being oriented to exit or voice. Subsequently 
there is a specification of the instruments of governance specified in Table 1. 
 The different potential features of  learning groups are summarized in Table 2.  
 
--------------------------------- 
table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 Clearly, the different features collected in Table 2 are not separate or independent: 
there are many connections between them. Or in other words: learning groups yield systemic 
configurations of features. Indeed, our prediction is that groups fail to the extent that the 
features are inconsistent with each other. From the earliers analysis a number of consistent 
connections between the features follow. A non-exhaustive list of examples of consistent 
features is given below: 
 
- Exploration (exploitation) requires cognitive distance (proximity) 
- Cognitive distance limits mutual understanding  
- Cognitive distance also limits mutual identification and empathy, as a basis for trust   
- To achieve mutual understanding and identification one needs to engage in specific 
 investments 
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- In case of specific investments, the durability of ties has to be sufficient to recoup the 
 investments (or else they will not be made).   
- Durability also affects opportunities to engage in indwelling, mutual identification 
 and empathy, to build both understanding and trust. 
- High density increases internal spillover (note that spillover is meant here in a 
 neutral sense, it does not necessarily entail a risk, in the sense of a danger to 
 competitive position)   
- Low exclusiveness of the group and external ties increase external spillover 
- Threat of spillover limits willingness to give information 
- When cognitive distance is large or change of knowledge is fast, there is less risk of 
 spillover 
- When spillover is perceived as a danger, it may lead to a reduction of density in the 
 group, to limit internal spillover, and to exclusiveness of the group, to limit external 
 spillover 
- Exclusiveness and low density reduce variety of cognition, which constrains 
 exploration 
- Exclusiveness and low density may also limit competition and thereby limit 
 efficiency 
- Structural equivalence may entail rivalry, which would increase the fear of spillover 
- Higher density of ties entails a greater probability of reputational loss or gain 
 
 The application of this framework can be illustrated by applying it to the familiar 
notion of a community of practice. In our understanding it would be characterized as 
indicated in Table 3. There is high mutual dependence among the members, with high 
specific investments for mutual understanding and identification, but this carries little threat 
of hold-up, due to internal norms, indwelling, identification and empathy as a basis for trust. 
There were specific investments in the past, but they have mostly been recouped. Due to long 
interaction cognitive distance is small. There are internal reputation effects, but due to a 
certain closure to the outside world there is limited risk of spillover outside the community. 
A potential weakness of this community is lack of exploration due to closure and small 
cognitive distance.    
 
  
------------------------------------ 
table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
 Now we turn to the empirical study, to see whether in practice other groups than 
communities of practice can be found, and whether they reflect the theoretical features 
developed above. In a limited sense, this constitutes a test: to see whether the theoretical 
notions are found in practice, and whether the success or failure of learning groups can be 
explained by the theoretical logic. However, the study is also exploratory: we are scouting for 
unknown learning groups and we are open to the discovery of new features. 
 
Case description 
A case study was conducted in a firm that we name X. X is a global management consulting 
and information technology services company, present in over 20 countries with about 
39.600 employees all over the world. The research was conducted at the Dutch branch of X, 
in the Business consultancy (BC) unit, consisting of about 80 people. In August 1999 and 
January 2000, 19 interviews were conducted at the Dutch headquarters of X with senior and 
junior business consultants and managing consultants. Managing consultants lead functional 
groups of around 15 business consultants each. In some cases, we talked to the business unit 
manager. The interviews took about 1.5 hours and were recorded. 
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 X has a clear vision on HRM. There is strong emphasis on professional development 
and drive for excellence. Knowledge workers are considered an asset. However, there is also 
a strong emphasis on individual responsibility for one’s professional career and professional 
development. The general view is that the organization can facilitate the professional 
development of the individual but it is the knowledge worker him/herself who must do it. 
Consistent with this HRM policy is the view that, in principle, every knowledge worker must 
take care of his/her own assignments. Depending on the assignment, the consultants work 
alone or in project teams with a client for several months up to several years. The 
composition of project teams depends on the expertise required and on the available 
consultants. There is a general rule that about 70% of the time of a knowledge worker should 
be productive for a client. Salary consists of two components. There is a basic component 
plus an addition that depends 1. on the performance of the national branch, 2. on the 
performance of the business unit, and 3. on the performance of the functional group within 
the business unit. The variable part of the salary is circumscribed as a variable performance 
indicator. Summing up, we find a mix of internal competition for careers, in individual 
responsibility for competence and acquisition of projects, and group-based incentives.  
 In about 1998, only the market focus was stressed, and the consultants became 
members of a so-called ‘focus market group’ (FMG). As the name implies, the primary goal 
of the FMG was to observe changes in the market and act on these changes through the 
development of new instruments to support the assignment process. Examples of such FMGs 
are ‘social security and insurance’ or ‘corporate and merchant banking,’ etc. The KPI (critical 
performance indicator) part of the salary depends in large part on the performance of the 
FMG. A third goal of the FMG – besides market watch and allocating accountability for 
financial performance – was building up a home base for the consultants. The members of an 
FMG could consult their peers with varying concerns and questions. A managing consultant 
is at the top of the FMG, but in fact he/she was ‘primus inter pares.’  
 The problem arose that consultants were often employed in other projects than those 
within their own FMG. As a consequence, the expertise of many members of a FMG 
developed in a different direction from the original market focus. Nowadays, organizational 
structure is changing again. The business unit managers now have delegated various tasks to 
the managing consultants (of the FMG) who together form a management team. Financial 
performance is now measured on the level of the whole business unit. The role of the FMG in 
the new organization is not clear at the moment. In this situation, different FMGs have 
chosen different perspectives for their purpose.  
 Consultancy is defined within X as skills or knowledge in three domains: 
substance/content (i.e., market development, tools, methods), personal skills, and consultancy 
skills. On a more abstract level, the development of a consultant is described within X as 
development of  ‘being’, ‘skills’, and ‘knowledge’. Learning, therefore, is also positioned 
within this triangle. Learning of knowledge is provided by the numerous courses and training 
programs offered. Diverse groups are experimenting in how to foster the other two forms of 
learning. This research was conducted mainly in order to find out how ‘being (a consultant)’ 
and ‘consultancy skills’ are learned. 
 
Results 
In the research we identified four groups where, according to the respondents, learning takes 
place, or is intended to do so. Individual forms of learning, which mostly occur between a 
senior mentor and a junior or between two peer consultants, are left outside this description. 
Only forms of learning on the level of a group are considered. We first give a brief verbal 
description and then we see to what extent the groups satisfy the categories and the logic for 
learning groups developed above.  
 
Project Team 
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Project teams consist of several consultants – sometimes also from other business units 
within X. In order to facilitate and encourage cooperation within a project team, X has 
recently begun to experiment with special attention to team processes. An attempt is made to 
find a balanced composition for the team (with the help of Belbin’s questionnaire)1. Before 
the start of the project, the members of the team were given a few days off in order to get to 
know each other. This was experienced as very valuable, because every team-member could 
explain his personal and private situation. This information helped to reduce ambiguity about 
he behaviour of a team member. E.g. a certain member started working after 9 a.m. because 
he had to bring his child to school. It was the common assignment to a client that initiated 
their collaboration. As the team consisted of four members, there was intensive interaction 
between all the members. There was no change in membership during the project. At the time 
of the present research, this project was finished. The members of the project team did not 
believe that the common practice during the project would be continued as a community of 
practice.  
The team members reported that they learned a lot from each other, especially non-canonical 
knowledge. An example: the team used a certain tool that all members had learned to use in 
official courses organized by X. One team member reported that the tool, which was used by 
the team, is now much clearer than before this project: ‘Of course, I already knew the tool, 
but now I have seen how my colleagues apply this tool ….’. Asked why he now understands 
this tool much better, he admits that he has now really experienced how this tool is applied. 
The team also developed new methods for implementing changes in the client organization. 
Asked for the reasons why the project members were inclined to try new methods, the answer 
was that they developed these methods together and they have committed themselves. As one 
respondent said: ‘The manner in which the workshop were set up was decided by the group 
as a whole, and things were discussed there; I never would have come up with it on my own.’ 
These statements confirm that in particular non-canonical knowledge was learned in this 
community. The basis for interaction can be circumscribed as indwelling, where members 
really delved into a colleague’s use of a method. There was a lot of mutual adaptation and 
voice: ‘Why I started applying things I hadn´t before – because we had agreed to do it this 
way;  you know, you don´’t have to agree with everything, but if you are going to work as a 
team… We had decided that we would do it in this fashion and we did it that way, and I did a 
number of things I normally never would have done.’ 
 There was a team meeting every week in which both the progress made on the project 
and the team process were discussed. During these moments of reflection, possible conflicts 
or dissatisfaction within the team were discussed in a straightforward and timely fashion. The 
attention given to the team process was experienced as very valuable. It supported the 
development of a joint enterprise: ‘I noticed that you are systematically given the opportunity 
to state what’s gone right and particularly what´s gone wrong, and it´s important to get these 
things out on the table and then you find that – at first you hesitate: should I bring this up? 
Well, why not! – and then you find that you are not the only one; there are four or five others 
who agree with you. You’re not alone, it becomes an important issue, you’ve got it off your 
chest and a week later the whole thing is resolved, that’s how fast it goes.’ And: ‘We 
developed a team tool, in which we incorporated the values that we had put together as a 
team – we believe this and this and this to be important – we incorporated those into a team 
tool and we used that to score on a weekly basis so we could measure our progress in time 
and we could use it to lock on to the things we thought were going well: so when at a given 
point there was a good deal of friction about something, we could say, well that’s a question 
of project management or the course we were taking or whether or not there was sufficient 
communication concerning vision or shared goals, you name it, and that led to our being able 
to resolve these problems within a week.’ 
 
                                                     
1 Belbin’s questionnaire is a tool for the composition of a team ( see e.g. Belbin 1984) 
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Expert Group 
Another social structure for learning that could be identified was what we call the expert 
group. Expert groups originate not in a specific common context of application (there is no 
‘context-boundedness’), but in a common content of generic knowledge. Participation does 
not follow from common practice. There is no other common goal than learning explicit, 
codified knowledge. Participants do not expect that the acquired knowledge is directly related 
to daily work practices. There is not much discussion about the meaning of the acquired 
knowledge for the individual participant during the meeting. Every participant makes sense 
of the acquired knowledge on his/her own. Experts report the result of their (re-search) 
process.  
 Participants meet on a regular basis, around a certain theme (content), in which the 
participating consultants are especially interested. As far as their daily work is concerned the 
participants are involved in very different projects and FMG´s; some members even come 
from other divisions within X. The non-redundant contacts (Burt, 1992) expand even to the 
external environment of X, e.g. speakers from universities are invited. Some of these expert 
groups are more institutionalized than others. They get a budget and a target (e.g. the 
development of a tool) by the management of the business unit. Other expert groups are 
formed voluntarily. Everybody can become member of an expert group without fulfilling any 
condition. 
 
Focus Market Group 
As already described above, FMGs are fully institutionalized. Up to about a year ago, the 
FMGs even had financial consequences in the reward system. Members of a FMG now meet 
at least once a month for half a day. As there is a considerable difference between the various 
FMGs as far as learning is concerned, we have to distinguish different types, with different 
goals. 
 One group has decided to meet for the sake of their own professional development. 
Thus the shared goal is: learning for professional (individual) development. We call this the 
‘professional development’ group. Another FMG has decided to take as a common goal: 
learning for project improvement. The declared aim was to discuss the current projects of the 
individual members in order to give advice for improvement. In fact, as will be discussed 
below, this group failed to achieve its purpose. However, it turned out to be useful for an 
entirely different purpose, which we call ‘orientation’. 
 
Professional development 
The development group discusses general themes of professional development, such as the 
norms and values of a consultant, conflict handling, giving unsollicited advice to a client. The 
members report a symmetrical relationship. The whole group decides whether a new member 
is accepted. New members can also come from outside. Group membership is relatively 
stable. In their daily work the members are involved in quite different projects. The members 
of the group may or may not work together in a project. They meet on a regular basis (mostly 
once a month). Absenteeism is very low; members are concerned when somebody is absent. 
Members report that they learn a lot because their colleagues ask very critical questions that 
strike them personally as professionals and make them reflect. Although the themes that are 
chosen by the group are so generic that everybody can contribute, members report that they 
nevertheless bring in their personal experience. The group does not discuss a concrete case or 
project, but discusses general issues, with which a consultant is confronted in his/her daily 
practice. Their own experience concerning these general issues is used for the discussion as a 
kind of case-study. The projects in which the members are involved are so diverse that there 
is a variety of experiences which can be brought in.  
 Members often cannot reach full treatment or final answers to a question during the 
meeting. Often, an individual process of reflection is initiated by a colleague’s questions. 
There is no pressure and no attempt to reach consensus, either on the general issue or on the 
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personal experience that was brought in. The group as a whole does not determine what good 
practice is. Each individual member draws his/her own conclusions. However, there is 
intensive feedback, with a short cycle, during the meeting. The members use the group as 
working space and not just to narrate their experiences. Through discussion, feedback, and 
critical questions by colleagues, members are invited to explicate some of their implicit 
assumptions. Participants are eager to give comments and feedback to colleagues. The 
individual member decides whether and how he/she utilizes the comments. 
 
From project improvement to orientation 
The group that was intended for project improvement takes the various projects of the 
members as input for group discussions. The intention is that a member could present (parts 
of) a current project and the group could help to improve this project by giving advice, hints 
and tricks. Often, the agenda is determined by the managing consultant. The meetings take 
place once a month. Absenteeism is high and irregular. Absence is mostly explained by the 
priority of the current project or a client. Other group members do not question the reasons 
for absence.  
 Members  report that they do not learn a lot during the meetings. Project 
improvement can hardly take place as the group does not succeed in discussing projects in 
sufficient detail. Generally, the meeting ends when every member has had a turn to tell about 
the current project. Sometimes, the story about a project is interrupted by a question related 
to the project (and not related to the craftsmanship of the consultant as in the development 
group). However, there is no pressure from other group members to explain the detailed 
background and course of a current project. As a member explains: ‘This would cost too 
much time, and in this case not every member would get his turn.’ 
 Another reason that was given for the low motivation to really discuss a project were 
the following. As the members talk about their actual work as professionals, they try to give a 
positive (or at least not too negative) story. The impression has to be avoided that somebody 
does not function properly in a project: ‘There are a lot of ambitions in the group and the 
participants want to achieve them. They don’t want to bring up matters that will hinder them 
from reaching their goals.’ And: ‘The information that comes out in the group has to be safe. 
Some things could play a role in one’s career. That’s why individuals do not want to admit 
they are incapable of certain things. There are no safety-checks.’ As the managing director is 
member of the group, it is not clear what the consequences could be.  
 A third reason for not learning according to the respondents lies in the missing 
knowledge about the project. An individual must provide a lot of information and effort 
before others can realistically react, and then they must make an effort to absorb all the 
relevant details. The superficial information that can be given does not foster learning: ‘It’s 
better if you know more because then you hear more in what is said and it’s more interesting; 
then real dialogue is possible, although it is difficult to do it with the whole group.’  
 Still another reason for lack of learning is that the themes are very time-sensitive. 
When a consultant feels the need of a colleague’s advice, this is mostly not the time when a 
meeting is scheduled. As the members admit, for all these reasons the willingness to share 
knowledge and experience is low. The participants think about stopping this type of meeting, 
if the situation does not change. However, they do not wish to abolish the group totally. They 
like meeting their colleagues and hearing about the projects everybody is currently involved 
in. Furthermore, contacts are continued in other settings. When an individual member gets 
the impression that somebody else can help him/her, this person will be contacted outside the 
group. 
 Summing up: while the group failed in its purpose of project improvement, it served 
a function of orientation on who is involved in what kind of project, or has what kind of 
competence, to be followed up in other contacts outside the group.   
 
Discussion  
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In Table 4 we specify the groups we found according to the categories developed earlier 
(Table 2). Under type of learning we have added a category INTERACTION that emerged 
from the case as clearly important. It makes a lot of difference whether the group aims at and 
accomplishes intensive interaction and feed back. That has implications for the type of 
learning and for the ‘indwelling’ that may provide a basis for trust.  
 When we compare the project team with the community of practice (Table 3), we see 
that it is largely similar. The participants were involved in learning during practice. 
Especially non-canonical knowledge was learned, as the example of the application of a 
certain methodology indicates. The project is described as a joint enterprise. This was 
supported by attention to the team-process. The participants developed shared values, which 
they used in order to reflect on the team process. In fact, the project-team developed a shared 
identity. This helped to use trust as a basis for governance, limiting threats of reputational 
loss, hold-up and spillover. Spillover is also reduced by a certain closure to the outside of the 
team. However, the project team has less continuity than a Community of Practice: after a 
specific project is finished, the team is disbanded, whereas a Community of Practice deals 
with a succession of projects. It was not ongoing local needs but a common assignment to a 
client that created the coherence of the team. As a result, closure is less and cognitive 
distance is not so reduced as would typically be the case in a community of practice. As a 
result, trust may be less ‘thick’ than in a community of practice, but this type of group has the 
advantage of more turnover of staff, and greater variety of knowledge, which would be 
beneficial for exploration.  
 The expert group constitutes a clear type that is very different from the community of 
practice. There are few specific investments among these professionals sharing specialized, 
highly codified, generic knowledge. As a result, switching costs are low and there is no hold-
up problem. There does seem to be a possible spillover risk. There is no basis for trust from 
identification and empathy in a shared project. However, the spillover risk may be eliminated 
by a balance of reciprocal knowledge transfer. It may be that the value of knowledge one gets 
exceeds the possible disutility of spillover. In fact, mutual spill-over can be an important 
means for realizing reciprocity. This is confirmed in the Linux-community (DeFilippi and 
Arthur, 2000). That case showed that reciprocal exchange is also enhanced by the positive 
reputation effect of yielding a contribution that is recognized and acknowledged across a 
community of peers. Another possibility is that participants do hold back on knowledge that 
is too close to their position in job competition. It may also be that there is little job 
competition, or that the risk is compensated by rewards in relation to their contribution of 
knowledge to others.  
 When we turn to the professional development group, we see some similarity to the 
expert group, but also important differences. Whereas learning in the expert group was 
generic in the sense that it was not bound to specific contexts of application, it was specific 
to a specialized professional topic. In the development group, learning is less specialized: the 
members choose to take quite general themes for reflection. There is also much more 
interaction and feedback. This enables the group to exchange more tacit knowledge. They use 
their own experience in practice as material to work with. However, own experience is 
abstracted from its specific context, and becomes a hypothetical case: some details are 
highlighted, others are left out. Context-specific detail need not be fully incorporated. 
Situations may be discussed that never actually happened. Members can hide in vague 
references such as ‘…imagine that…’ and ‘…as I once have experienced…’ Thus experience 
is turned into ‘near histories’ and ‘hypothetical histories’ as critical events for thought 
experiment (March et al., 1996:4). These are events ‘which have not really happened but 
which could have plausibly happened or which almost happened. Such simulated conditions 
are sometimes more prone for learning than real historical events’ (March et al., 1996:7). The 
specification of real events is more risky: they have real legal, financial or reputational 
consequences. By using simulated case-descriptions, an experimental space is created where 
the individual can explore and play with ideas without feeling threatened. Spillover risk is 
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limited, since the knowledge involved is general, and has little connections with specialized 
competencies by which consultants distinguish themselves. To achieve mutual understanding 
and identification, some specific investment was needed, but it was also limited, since the 
subjects discussed were not specialized. Investment was specific in the sense that people had 
to adjust to each other’s personal experience and perception, but not to specific contexts of 
specific projects. It is possible that the perceptiveness developed here is applicable more 
generally, so that the investment is not specific to the group.  
 In the project improvement group, the aim was to analyze and improve the projects in 
which the members are currently involved. In contrast with the development group, the 
stories are realistic accounts of real events. However, learning does not occur. This is an 
interesting failure. This form of group cannot reach its purpose for several reasons. First, the 
consultants did not really need each other, in the sense that they had to come up with good 
results together, in a shared project. Giving advice did not entail a commitment with shared 
responsibility for the project. Second, coming from different projects, the consultants did not 
share the necessary tacit, context specific knowledge. To achieve sufficient understanding of 
the project, needed to generate relevant advice, would require far more time than was 
available in the meetings. Furthermore, the effort for others to understand a specific project 
would constitute a specific investment, which would be made only if the relationship would 
last sufficiently long to recoup it, and that was simply not the case: contacts were incidental 
and ad hoc. The investment in understanding was specific, i.e. could not be used in the 
consultants’ own projects. In other words: trying to understand a specific project was simply 
not worth the effort, since it was insufficiently relevant for one’s own project. In contrast 
with the project team there is no shared resonsibility for a joint project, no ongoing 
interaction that makes specific investmenst worth while, and no building of mutual empathy 
and trust that eliminate risks of reputation and spillover. 
 It can be threatening to divulge your problems and failures in public to people you 
have no intimate, durable working relationship with. The reputational risk  is large. There is a 
high degree of outside ties of the members of the group: they are members of diverse other 
groups. There is a high probability that a member of the group will work with another 
member on a future project. Here, we might apply the analysis of structural holes. There is a 
risk that knowledge divulged about weak performance might be used as a basis for refusing 
collaboration in future, or as a hostage, for blackmail, with the threat to divulge it to 
management or clients. Krackhardt’s line of argument might also apply. Since the discussions 
in the improvement group are public, one has to satisfy the norms of both the project group 
one represents and the group itself. This constrains what one is able to tell. One may 
jeopardize the support of the team one represents. This adds to the reasons not to divulge too 
much. There was no basis for trust to cover relational risks, neither in a balance of mutual 
dependence, nor in prior ‘indwelling’ and shared experience as a basis for shared norms of 
conduct and empathy. Some of the consultants may be familiar with each other on the basis 
of earlier joint projects, but is not likely to be the case for all members. This problem of 
relational risk could perhaps be overcome by norms on the firm level, in a strong corporate 
culture, but apparently it was not. Thus, relations tended to be in the nature of exit rather than 
voice. This group was too unlike a community of practice and the project team discussed 
above to achieve its goal of project improvement.  
 This does not imply, however, that the group is useless also for other purposes. The 
members said that there was no learning, but that the contacts were useful for a different 
purpose: an orientation on who was doing what and how. Thus, they could select partners for 
developing bilateral contacts later on. This suggests that the group is successful as an 
orientation group. That group does not have the purpose to actually exchange or build 
knowledge on content or project, but to provide a market-place, as it were, for consultants to 
orient themselves on the demand and supply of knowledge. For this purpose, the meetings 
should be arranged for consultants to be able to make at least a preliminary judgement of 
whom they might trust. This needs to entail the different aspects of trust: in competence (can 
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colleagues supply relevant and useful knowledge), intentions (will they not expropriate 
knowledge, make a commitment, exhibit care, and refrain from free-riding), honesty and 
institutional conditions, such as work-load, support, motives (to enable their contribution). 
On the basis of that they can pick up the contact and develop a collaborative relationship 
outside the meeting. 
 
Conclusions 
We have developed and applied a theoretical framework for the identification, classification 
and evaluation of different learning groups. The framework included features related to the 
type of learning, social structure, relational risk and governance. Overall, the theoretical 
framework demonstrated its usefulness. The groups that we found empirically varied in the 
dimensions that were proposed, and their success or failure could be explained on the basis of 
the theoretical framework. We also encountered some things that were not incorporated in 
the theoretical framework. 
 One new feature that came up was the degree of interaction and feedback between 
members of the group. That is important for a number of other features. Interaction is not 
needed for the mere exchange of codified knowledge, but it is needed to develop shared 
cognition, indwelling, identification, empathy and trust. That occurs in the community of 
practice, the project team, and the development goup. Its importance becomes clear in view 
of the need to develop trust on the basis of identification. It is also clear when we refer back 
to the trust process as described by Zand, which was briefly summarized above. 
 From the project team we learned that it can achieve many of the benefits of a 
community of practice, with an added advantage of greater flexibility and variation for the 
sake of exploration next to exploitation. A condition seems to be that next to the shared 
project, systematic attention should be given to the team process. 
 From the expert group we learned that high spillover risk may be accepted on the 
basis of a profitable balance of gain and loss of knowledge, and/or positive reputation effects.   
 From the development group we learned that indwelling, as a basis for identification, 
need not be based on joint goals and experience in a joint project or a community of practice. 
It can also be based on abstracted experience told in the form of  ‘near histories’ or 
‘hypothetical histories’. We also learned that this abstraction from personal experience can 
eliminate reputational risk, spillover risk, and the risk of information being used as a hostage. 
 The improvement group is an interesting failure. Its failure could be well explained 
with the theoretical framework. In view of its form it could not be expected to achieve its 
purpose. It could, however, serve another purpose. That leads us to a another new group: the 
orientation group, where people meet in order to asses the supply and demand of knowledge 
and orient themselves on potential future partners. 
 Our empirical work did not systematically take into account the organizational 
conditions that might influence the functioning of the group, especially governance. Risks 
that arise in groups might be lessened or amplified by organizational culture. This should be 
taken into account in future work. In particular, one might compare groups that are 
structurally similar but arise in different organizations with different cultures, to identify 
possible culture effects. In this article we used the theoretical framework for an ex-post 
explanation of learning groups that were identified empirically. The framework might also be 
used to predict viable forms, and then test their occurrence.   
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Table 1 Sources of cooperation 
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   macro      micro 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
egoistic  sanctions from some   material advantage or self-interest: 
  authority (the law, god, Leviathan, shadow of the future, reputation, 
  dictator, patriarch, organization) , hostages. 
  contractual obligation    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
altruistic ethics: values, social norms of  bonds of friendship, kinship; 
  proper conduct, moral obligation, routines, habituation 
  sense of duty 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
source: adapted from Williams (1988).  
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Table 2 Possible features of learning groups 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Type of learning 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Level    individual or collective 
Object   generic: improve context-independent knowledge or competence 
   (declarative, highly codified), or specific: improve performance in a 
   specific project or practice (procedural, highly tacit) 
Degree   exploitation/incremental improvement or exploration/radical change  
Knowledge  canonical, declarative, codified or non-canonical, procedural, tacit 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural features 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
density   number of ties 
centrality  members with relatively many ties 
structural equivalence members with similar patterns of ties 
outside ties  other groups or networks one is a member of, at the same time 
structural holes  lack of ties between parts 
cognitive distance difference in categories of thought and evaluation 
durability  duration of ties 
exclusiveness  closure to outsiders 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Relational risk  large or small 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Need   high or low need for each other, with lack of alternatives 
Reputational risk loss or gain of reputation 
Strategic risk  loss or gain of competitive position (hold-up, spillover) 
- competition 
- specific investments 
- spillover  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Governance  voice or exit 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Deterrence  formal agreement, hostages, reputation, ‘quid pro quo’ 
Trust   org. culture, organizational norms 
   reciprocity, prior familiarity, indwelling/empathy, internal 
             norms 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3 Community of Practice 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Type of learning 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Level    collective 
Object   specific project or practice (procedural, highly tacit) 
Degree   exploitation/incremental improvement  
Knowledge  non-canonical, tacit, procedural 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural features 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
density   high  
centrality  low 
structural equivalence high  
structural holes  low 
outside ties  low 
cognitive distance low 
durability  long 
exclusiveness  high  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Relational risk  low  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Need   high 
Reputational risk  Potentially high due to high density of ties, but actually low due to 
   tight personal ties and high trust 
Strategic  low, due to high mutual trust 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Governance  voice 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Deterrence  balance of dependence 
Trust   indwelling, familiarity, identification, durability of relation,  
   routinization, internal norms 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 4 Learning groups 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Project team Expert group Professional  Project  Orientation 
      development improvement 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Type of learning        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
level  collective individual individual individual individual 
object  specific   generic  generic  specific  specific 
degree  exploitation exploration exploration exploitation neither 
knowledge non-canonical, canonical, procedural tacit  explicit 
  tacit  explicit  tacit 
Interaction high  low  high  low  low 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural features 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
density  high   low  high  low  low 
centrality low  low  low   low  low 
str. equivalence high  low  low  low  low 
outside ties low  high  high  high  high 
structural holes low  high  high  high  high 
cogn. distance low  low  high  high  high 
continuity limited  low  high  low  low 
exclusiveness high  low  high  low  low 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Relational risk low   low  low  high  low 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Need  high  high  low  low  low 
Reputational risk low  high  low  high  low 
Strategic risk    
- competition low  high  high  high  high 
- spec. investm. high  low  low  high  low 
- spillover  medium  high  low  high  low 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Governance voice  exit  voice  exit  exit 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Deterrence balance of  exclusion as reputation hostages, exclusion 
  dependence penalty on    reputation 
    free-riding, 
    reputation 
Trust  reciprocity, prior familiarity indwelling none  none 
  indwelling, perhaps empathy empathy  other than other than 
            empathy,     prior  prior 
  internal norms     familiarity familiarity 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Success  high  high  high  low  high 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: the group that started as project improvement is listed twice, with the same structural 
characteristics but with different aims: project improvement and orientation.  
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